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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT PIERCE, E. A. TIFFANY,
FRED WALT-ERS, and DEWAYNE
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Plaintiffs and Respondents

vs.
ROBERT W. PEPPER, dba R. W. PEPPER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Defendant
and
MAJESTIC CORPORATION, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant

Case No.
10209

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was commenced by a group of labormen,
alleged employees of one Robert W. Pepper, hereinafter
referred to as "Pepper," who claimed that they were not
paid by Pepper for some of their wages earned while
working for him. They brought suit against said Pepper,
their employer, who failed to defend the action, and
against Majestic Corporation, a Utah Corporation, he;reinafter referred to as "Majestic," (whose president is
Dr. Roy W. Humpherys, hereinafter referred to as "Humpherys"), the owner of the property upon which Pepper
and his workmen performed certain services which, in
part, form the basis of the workmen's claim. The suit
against Pepper was prosecuted by reason of Pepper's
direct breach of contract. The suit against Majestic
was prosecuted because Majestic had failed to require
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of Pepper that he post bond according to the requirements of 14-4-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that
by reason of the penalty provisions set forth in 14-2-2,
Majestic was jointly liable with the contractor for the
unpaid wages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Pepper defaulted, but curiously enough, the judgment rendered June lOth says nothing about Pepper's
liability. Majestic defended on the theories of estoppel,
release, accord, settlement, satisfaction, and payment.
The case was tried and a decision was rendered. In the
court's decision, findings, conclusions, and judgment, the
issues of estoppel and release of joint obligors were wholly ignored. The holding merely recites that the releases
given by the workmen, releasing Majestic, were void for
lack of consideration. Judgment was rendered against
Majestic only and in favor of the plaintiffs Pierce, Tiffany, Fred Walters and DeWayne Walters, in the amounts
of $510.10, $555.10, $474.48, and $471.23, respectively, together with interest thereon and costs of court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant Majestic seeks to have the judgment
of the lower court reversed in its entirety, as to itself,
and to have judgment of no cause of action entered in
favor of Majestic and against all of the plaintiffs, and to
have the costs of this appeal awarded to it.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant Majestic owned certain properties in
Tooele, Utah upon which the plaintiffs worked. Pepper
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3
contracted with Majestic to do certain phases of construction for agreed amounts. (See exhibit 19 wherein Pepper
is erroneously called a Sub-Contractor) and in fact
worked on these projects during part of 1962. Pepper
hired his own workmen. The plaintiffs were among those
he hired. How long the workmen had worked for Pepper
is not ascertainable from the record, but is not an important fact. They had first worked in Provo, then Moab,
then Tooele. Things apparently went well between the
three parties. Majestic the owner, Pepper the contractor, and the workmen the plaintiffs, until August
13th. According to the agreement between the parties
(See paragrgaph 4 (e) of Exhibit 19) and the actual
practice of the parties, the workmen periodically executed and delivered written statements stating they had
been paid their wages and delivered appropriate lien releases to Pepper who in turn delivered the same to Majestic. Upon delivery he, Pepper, was able to get his
draws. (See Exhibit No. 10, dated 7/30/62; Exhibit 11,
dated 8/6/62; Exhibit 12, dated 8/13/62). This arrangement was in compliance with the contract and worked
well. This, of course, necessitated Pepper's having enough
solvency to :float one complete payroll. He couldn't get
a draw from Majestic on the completed work until he
himself had paid the workmen therefor, and in fact,
received their lien waivers, evidencing receipt of payment of their wages earned. In other words, it wasn't
Majestic's money that was used to pay for the workmen's
lien waivers, it was Pepper's. Only after Pepper's money
had been used to pay the workmen for the completed
work, could Pepper get paid by Majestic. When Majestic
then paid Pepper, Pepper could replenish the fund and
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have money of his own in reserve to pay the next week's
payroll. Shortly before August 13, Pepper's payroll
checks started bouncing.
What the immediate cause of the bouncing check
.problem was is somewhat vague, but it seemed to have
been caused by goverment action. Page 213 of the Transcript discloses (on line 20 to 24) that the "government
beat Pepper to the money to pay the workmen." Perhaps
a treasury seizure or levy depleted the funds to that the
checks of. Pepper to the workmen wouldn't clear the bank.
'The matter was obviously one of concern especially to
the workmen. Until then Dr. Roy W. Humpherys, Majestic's president, had hardly noticed the workmen, having perhaps seen them on the job a few times as Pepper's
employees, but having never really known their names,
status, or terms of employment. Trying to unravel the
record as to how the problem of the bounced checks came
to the attention of Pepper and Humpherys is interesting
but unimportant. The fact is simply, that in spite of the
conflicting evidence, the knowledge of the bounced checks
did come to the attention of the workmen, Pepper, and
Humpherys in the course of things, and was the main
reason for the series of meetings which produced the
settlement agreement, the efficacy of which is one of the
major.issues in this law suit.
At the meeting between. Pepper, Humpherys and the
workmen the various workmen made demands of Majestic for their unpaid claims. Trying to find the basis of
these is an interesting pursuit. Each one of the workmen
has about three different versions as to what he had coming. While each version turns out to be an unproven con-
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elusion, one version is contained in the separately published deposition of each plaintiff. Another version is
found in the affidavits offered in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and another version
is found in the testimony given at trial. The testimony at
trial is most interesting. It indicates that the men don't
have any affirmative recollection of the number of hours
they worked during the week after August 13th, but yet
they claim that Majestic's earlier payment to them covered only the wages earned after August 13th. They only
remember presenting a written invoice, which curiously
turns out to be prepared by Pepper for the workmen who
themselves could not testify as to the number of hours
they worked or their rate of pay. The incompetence of
the compounded hearsay evidence upon which a finding
was based will be discussed later, but whatever may be
said for the reliability of the evidence in this respect, the
fact remains that for each of the men there was approximately one week's work involved, give or take one or two
days. These were men who were employed at about
$100.00 to $150.00 per week. Their wage claim, apart
from the bounced checks, would have been for less than
$150.00 each for the wages earned after August 13th.
Majestic was faced with the demand of the workmen that Majestic reimburse them for Pepper's bounced
checks. The workmen were faced with the potential
counterclaim of Majestic against them for having misled
Majestic by representing not once, but on several occasions, in writing, that they had been paid by Pepper and
had waived their lien rights, on the basis of which Majestic had permitted Pepper to make progress draws. Majestic was further faced with the dubious, doubtful, vague
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"invoices" · prepared by Pepper for some claim by the
workmen for wages that the workmen themselves, much
less Majestic knew nothing about. At the conclusion of
the demands and counter-demands, the parties entered
into a beautifully simple, uncomplicated agreement: Majestic as one party, Pepper as another party, and the
Workmen separately as third parties simply agreed that
Majestic would not question the invoices of the workmen,
but pay them at face value. The workmen would, upon
receiving payment, completely and fully release Majestic
from any further liability and Pepper would pay to the
workmen any residual claim that they might have.
~

The. agreements were fully executed on all sides.
Written releases were prepared by Majestic and signed
by the workmen, which notwithstanding the inadequacies
of the language thereof, were understood, according to the
testimony given at the trial not only by Humpherys, but
also each of the workmen and Pepper to be the document
whch evidenced the complete, unequivocal and final release of Majestic from further liability. Humpherys paid
without questioning the full amount of the invoices, to
these men who might have each had a claim of $100 to
$150 for a week's wages, the sum of $208.93 to Fred
Walters, the sum of $276.13 to Wayne Walters, the sum of
$228.13 to R. R. Pierce, and the sum of $167.50 to E. A.
Tiffany. Pepper, the party who agreed to pay any residue
did not pay and was sued. A default has been entered
against him and the plaintiffs may obtain a judgment
against him at their pleasure.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PARTIES PLAINTIFF ARE BY THEIR OWN·
ACTIONS E.STOPPED FROM ASSERTING ANY
CLAIMS OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT MAJESTIC.
Estoppel is concisely defined by Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Volume 1, Section 139, Page 601,
as follows:
"The vital principle is, that he who, by his language or conduct, leads another to do what he
would not otherwise have done, shall not subject
such persons to loss or injury by disappointing
the expectations upon which he acted."
·
Nothing could better describe the facts in this case.
The plaintiffs all joined in signing a series of hand-written lien waivers for R.. W. Pepper, the last of which was
dated August 13th, 1962. These same lien waivers, evidencing payment were used by Pepper to exhibit to Majestic to obtain his progress draws. Majestic acting in
reliance thereupon issued a series of checks to Pepper,
the last two of which were issued on August 13th and
August· 15th, 1962. Had the plaintiffs not signed these
lien waivers, Pepper could not have obtained his draws
from Majestic. Now the plaintiffs say they weren't paid
because their· various checks from Pepper, the last of
which were also dated August 13th, 1962, bounced. While
this is extremely regrettable, one is forced to observe that
Pepper's checks weren't legal tender to the workmen, and
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they didn't have to sign lien waivers or anything else until they had been paid in legal tender. If by their own
election and in reliance upon previous favorable experience with Pepper's checks, they accepted the checks of
Pepper instead of legal tender as their pay, they cannot
be heard to complain, and if their representations have
been relied upon by Majestic in disbursing to Pepper, the
courts will close its ears to the plaintiffs' wailing and tell
them in the future not to sign any more representations
that they have been paid, until they have either been
paid in legal tender, can be sure that their checks will
clear, or are willing to assume the risk of looking solely
to the maker of the checks for satisfaction. Had Majestic
only known that Pepper's checks were bouncing and that
the workmen weren't being paid, it would have taken all
sorts of protective measures to protect not only the workmen, but itself as well. In this case, the workmen went on
misleading Majestic because there was not only one
bouncing check, but a series of bouncing checks, yet the
workmen went on letting Majestic think that they were
paid and that all was well. They are now by reason thereof estopped from changing their story.
Strangely, the court in its Minute Entry decision, and
later in its findings, conclusions and judgment brushed
aside the entire matter of estoppel. This principle alone
is dispositive of the whole case and renders .moot any
other issues, facts, or questions involved. Majestic respectively submits that the trial court erred repeatedly
in overlooking this most important principle, and missed
a wonderful opportunity to save time, money, and feelings
when it failed to grant Majestic's motion for summary
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Taking the documents separately, we find that the
invoices were admitted and used by the trial court to
prove the wages the workmen had earned after August
13th. The invoices were presented by the workmen but
were prepared by Pepper. Pepper prepared them from
information furnished him by the workmen who gave
him their time cards. Following the information from its
source to the trial court we find this situation: The workmen presumably knew their hours and rate of pay. They
told this to Pepper. Pepper prepared the invoices for the
workmen, based upon what the workmen told Pepper.
The workmen gave the invoices to Humpherys to tell
him what Pepper had told them what their hours were
based on what they had told Pepper. The invoices get
into evidence for the purpose of clarifying and explaining the background of the releases. Now the invoices
tell the trial judge what Pepper had told the workmen
what their ·hours were, based upon information which the
workmen had told Peper. We can't exactly tell whether
this is third or fourth-handed hearsay. The bottom part
of the invoices, where the calculating was done, was torn
off and thrown away before they were presented to Humpherys. Trying to conquer this plethora of information
having a pyramided degree of incompetence is interesting
mental gymnastics, but at the risk of being naive, one
might ask why all of the deviousness and circuity? Why
didn't the men simply tell the court how many hours they
had worked and what their rate of pay was? Had they
forgotten the number of hours, they could have consulted
their time cards to refresh their memories. (Pepper testified that he still had them) . Certainly they hadn't forgotten their rate of pay. Pepper was pulled like a rabbit
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a

out vof hai at the' last minute~of the-iri.afto.testifyagainst
Majestic. Why didn't he bring the men's time ·cards with
him?
Focusing our attention on Pepper's bounced checks,
we find them even less enlightening in proving the plaintiffs' case. One check contained $80.00 for a saw rental.
The trial court having the checks before it in evidence
simply presumed that they were written.for wages, even
disregarding the $80.00 saw rental. It is unnecessary to
trace the genealogy of the checks and prove them unworthy of cognizance in proving the number of hours the
plaintiffs worked and their rate of pay. Pepper also wrote
the bounced checks, and they are of as little value as the
invoices in proving the elements of the plaintiff's case.
What do the invoices and checks tell us about the
plaintiffs' ·hours and their rate of pay? Nothing - absolutely nothing. The only thing that can be said of the
checks and invoices is that they exist and formed the
backdrop against which the release and settlement agreement were negotiated.
Element No. 5 is also unproven. If rules of evidence
are to be abandoned and facts like reasonable rate of pay
are to be judicially noticed, and if decisions are to be decided on the basis of human experience and the laws of
probability, there is no need to fuss over this point. However, if we are to retain the integrity of the judicial system and the rules of evidence, it shouldn't be asking too
much to require plaintiffs to prove each element of their
causes of action.
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judgment at pre-trial and again when it failed to grant
Majestic's motion to dismiss when the plaintiffs first
rested.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE A PRIMA-FACIA
CASE FOR RELIEF AGAINST MAJESTIC.
The statute upon which the suit is based is contained
in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 14, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2. (Cited for brevity's sake as UCA 14-2-2) which
provides inter alia and in effect that Majestic is personally (presumably corporately) liable to all persons who
have not been paid who performed labor under Pepper's
contract.
In substance the statute provides that if Majestic had
a contract with Pepper in excess of $500.00 and did not
require of him that he post a bond as required by 14-2-1
for the protection of the workmen, that Majestic is liable
together with Pepper for the reasonable value of the work
performed and unpaid provided that the reasonable value
does not exceed the agreed value.
Needless to say, the plaintiffs have the burden of
proving their case by competent evidence. The necessary
elements of proof would be:
1. The existence of a contract between Majestic and Pepper in excess of $500.00.
2. The failure of Majestic to require and the
failure of Pepper to post a bond.
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3. The number of hours worked before August 13th, 1962 and the rate of compensation per
hour Pepper had agreed to pay them.
4. The number of hours worked after August
13th, 1962 and the rate of compensation Pepper
had agreed to pay them.
5. That the agreed rate both before and after
August 13th, 1962 was a reasonable rate.
6. That they had not been paid. (Payment is
ordinarily the duty of the defending party to
prove, but it is counsel's private theory that in
suits under the bonding law, that non-payment is
the burden of the plaintiffs to prove.)
By sifting the evidence, there is probably enough in
the record to prove elements No. 1 and No. 2. Element
No.3 and Element No. 4 fail miserably. The plaintiffs act
like it is difficult for them to testify to something as simpie as their hours worked and their rate of pay. Of course
the checks and the invoices are in evidence, and were
properly admitted for the purpose of laying a foundation
for the release agreement hereinafter referred to. But,
admitting the checks and invoices for the purpose of
proving hours worked and rate of compensation is not
only to rely on incompetent hearsay evidence but to rely
on evidence, the hearsay nature of which is geometrically
compounded.
Written documents, when introduced to prove a fact
stated thereon, are themselves hearsay evidence. When
the documents are prepared by somone who has learned
the information he puts on the documents from someone
else, this compounds the hearsay.
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Element No. 6 is also unproven, but since counsel's
theory on this point has never been decided, the most that
can be hoped for here is that the court might indulge itself in some dictwn to clarify the matter for future litigants.
While plaintiffs' counsel pursued with commendable
perserverance and diligence, his theory that Majestic
had only paid the wages earned since August 13th, the
plaintiffs failed to make their point, and the evidence
leaves us with proof on two of the elements of a cause of
action and with nothing on the other four elements. There
is not one word in the record as to the nwnber of hours
worked, the rate of pay, the reasonableness of the rate
and the fact of non-payment, and the actions of the plaintiffs and Pepper create some grave suspicions as to why
they withheld from the court the direct evidence they
were undisputedly capable of giving.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS DEFEATED BY AN
AGREEMENT SUBSEQUENT, WHICH IS AT L.EAST
A VALID RELEASE OF ONE OF TWO JOINT OBLIGORS WITH RIGHTS RESERVED AGAINST THE
OTHER.
The psychology of the plaintiffs appears to persuade
the court that they will be turned away without just
compensation for their work if they are not given judgment against Majestic, and to engage the court in some
sub-conscious speculation that since Pepper's checks
bounced and Majestic's didn't that Pepper isn't solvent
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and that if Majestic isn't held for the obligation, the
plaintiffs simply won't be paid. There is, of course, .nothing in the record on this matter and as a matter of law,
for whatever it's worth, the plaintiffs still have a valid
claim against Pepper, although it is hard to understand
why the memorandum decision, findings, conclusions, and
judgment do not even mention Pepper and his responsibility to these plaintiffs ..
A cursory reading of the applicable statute, however,
shows that its obvious intent and purpose is to make any
person subject to its provision contingently 'but jointly
liable with the primary obligor, who is the contractor,
for .the unpaid bills. The statute does not expressly or
inferentially release the contractor and substitute the
owner in his place as being the sole party liable to whom
the unpaid workman must look for satisfaction. The contractor's liability to the workmen survives and the owner's
liability to the workmen is added. The only time a problem in cases like this arises is when the owner pays the
contractor and· the contractor forgets, neglects, or refuses
to pay the workmen, and the unfortunate owner finds
himself in the same position. as the hapless accommodasion co-signer on a promissory note who finds out that
the principal obligor isn't going to perform.

Since the law in Utah on the matter of joint obligations has been codified in Chapter 4, of Title 15 of Utah
Code Annotated, it will be of little consequence to review
the matter of joint obligations and the legal consequences
that flowed from releases given by creditors to one of
two joint obligors at Common Law. It should be observed
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however, that there never was a time, at least in contract
law, when a ·creditor "couldn't deal separately with ope of
two obligors on any terms he chose to deal. His separate·
dealings did not affect the rights of the two, debtors
against each other. It simply affected the rights ~f the
creditor as first against one and secondly against the
other debtor.·
Under the facts of the instant case, Majestic fo-und
itself in the position of having paid once for the work to
Pepper and then being confronted with a second demand
by Pepper's ·creditors because Majestic didn't require of
Pepper that he post a bond as required by law and Pepper forgot to pay his workmen. There is absolutely no
reason why Majestic, Pepper and the Plaintiffs could not
deal with each other on any ·basis they saw fit. The
plaintiffs were the creditors and Pepper and Majestic
were the joint ·debtors. The three parties, the plaintiffs
separately as one party, Majestic as the second party and
Pepper as the third party after their mutual ~onfronta
tion, simply agreed tri-laterally that Majestic would
honor the plaintiffs' so-called "invoices" at face value.
Pepper would pay any balance owing to the plaintiffs
and the plaintiffs would release Majestic from any further liability. What a simply uncomplicated arrangement
and what a wonderful way for businessmen to resolve
their disputes.
While it is submitted that the language In 15-4-4,
and 15-5-5, is more helpful in Tort law than in Contract
law (Torts being expressly included by the provisions
of 15-1-1) it is submitted that the worst consequence
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that could follow Mc~.j estic under the facts of this case
would be those defined in 15-4-5, and the defenses
available under 15-4-5 against the plaintiff would be
those available to Pepper. Which of the two sub-paragraphs of 15-4-5 would apply here would depend on
the plaintiffs' knowledge of the respective extent that
Majestic and Pepper were severally primarily obligated
to the plaintiffs. Since the primary obligation was that
of Pepper's and Majestic was simply the guarantor by
operation of law, it seems to be useless mental exercise
to try to interpret in the light of 15-4-5 how much
credit Pepper can .claim against the plaintiffs for the
monies that Majestic paid to them.
To talk about the sufficiency or lack of sufficiency
of consideration at this point is to get ahead of the
story, but since its importance permeates the proceedings
it -may be well to consider its bearing upon this point,
although its full significance will be considered in the
next point in this brief.
Since respondents' trial brief has been made a part
of the trial record (pages 36 through 39) and since the
conclusions of law mention the question of consideration,
its presence in respondents' brief may be fairly anticipated and its bearing on this question analyzed.
Counsel cites (on page 37 of the record) a very fundamental principle of contract law, namely that a promise
(including a release) not supported by consideration is
unenforceable, and a release which relies upon the performance of a pre-existing legal duty as the consideration
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Now it is important here to bear .in mind that
Humpherys was scarcely aware that the plaintiffs even
existed until they started making demands upon him.
Their total claims consisted of some of Pepper's bounced
checks that were given to pay for wages allegedly earned
before August 13th, for a. saw rental, and for some
allegedly unpaid wages earned after August 13th. In
the settlement negotiations, no attempt was made to
differentiate between the three items. Invoices prepared
by Pepper were presented by the plaintiffs and paid by
Majestic and each invoice reflects an amount that could
not possibly have been earned in one week by the workmen, and $80.00 of the bounced checks represents payment for a "saw rental!" The argument made against the
validity of the releases is that the very existence of the
bounced checks liquidated the claim for wages until August 13th. If it had been the checks of Majestic that had
bounced, this would be a rather strong argument, o~ if
the checks were being used against Pepper, they would
be rather conclusive evidence against ·him, but when Pepper's checks are used against Majestic they leave much
to be desired. Since Majestic had no knowledge of the
existence of Pepper's bounced checks until later, their
existence can hardly be said to be an admission of Majestic or any other legal significance as between the
plaintiffs and Majestic.
As to the unpaid wages accruing after August 13th,
it can hardly be asserted that this was a liquidated
amount. The plaintiffs never worked under Majestic or
even under any of Majestic's employees. No time cards
were turned in to Majestic.
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There was no way of knowing whether the plaintiffs came to work late, confined their coffee-breaks to
pauses of acceptable length, slept or loafed on the job,
left for and came back from lunch periods at the correct
times, never went home early, and worked with reasonable diligence while on the job. Nor was there any profit
in Majestic's pursuing this question at any length. Important is only the fact that the plaintiffs were to present
"invoices," which Majestic paid without question, in
order to get rid of a vague, bothersome claim of some
workmen who allegedly hadn't been paid by their employer. Now how can anything be more un-liquidated
and more questionable than this claim?
Aside from the question of liquidity, there is the
question of the presence or absence of a dispute. The
interrogation of Dr. Humpherys went on endlessly with
monotonous repetition in an attempt to establish the
fact that the whole dispute between Majestic and the
Plaintiffs was because Dr. Humphreys quarrelled with
his legal liability to pay these men (because he, like
most owners didn't even know the bonding statute
existed), but did not have a bona-fide quarrel with the
amount of the workman's claim. There may be two
schools of though as to whether the plaintiffs succeeded
in establishing that the dispute was the former and not
the latter question, but it really doesn't matter. The
question is more academic than practical.
To illustrate the point that there is no difference
whether the dispute is as to amount, liability, or both,
assume that two cars collide in an open intersection,
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given for its validity, must fail for lack of an independent
and separate consideration. This is an obviously true
statement and hardly merits further comment. However, this principle is not very helpful in the case at
hand. It merely says that if a debtor owes a creditor the
sum of $100.00 and the debtor pays the creditor $50.00 for
a full release of his liability, the agreement of the
creditor to accept a lesser sum than the full sum is void
for lack of consideration and the creditor may pursue
the collection of the balance. No one can quarrel with
this proposition. It's obviously true.
This is completely different than a situation where
the Debtor No. 1 is primarily indebted to the Creditor
and Debtor No. 2 is jointly and contingently liable to
the Creditor because of a contractual undertaking or by
operation of law. Now what is there about the admittedly
true principle of law urged by plaintiffs' counsel· which
would prevent the Creditor from dealing separately with
Debtor ·No. 2, accepting partial payment from him, releasing him, and looking only then to Debtor No.1 for the
balance? Now this may precipitate a quarrel between
Debtor No. 1 and Debtor No.2, and may give Debtor No.
1 some windfall defenses if the Creditor hasn't been
requisitely circumspect in his observance of the requirements of UCA 15-4-4 and 15-5-5, but that isn't going to
change the legal status between the Creditor and
Debtor No. 2.
Stated differently, who would question the right
of an accommodation co-maker who, when he finds that
his co-debtor friend is faltering in the payment of his
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Pepper owes the plaintiffs a liquidated and undisputed debt for bounced checks of $100.00. The
plaintiffs have another claim against Pepper for
unpaid wages earned after August 13th. Assume
that Pepper disputed this claim. Pepper pays
$100.00 in return for the plaintiffs' agreement to
accept the $100.00 as payment of both claims.
There wouldn't be sufficient consideration for the
plaintiffs' agreement to release Pepper from the
second claim, since Pepper has only paid what he
was under a duty to pay.
This makes good sense. But where does it leave us
when we interject a third party into the illustration?
Assume the plaintiffs claim that both Pepper and
Majestic owe the plaintiffs a sum of money for
bounced checks. While as to Pepper the claim
may be unliquidated and disputed, Majestic
doesn't know anything about it (part of one check
being given to cover $80.00 in a saw rental). The
plaintiffs also have another claim against both
Pepper and Majestic for wages earned after
August 13th. Pepper accepts this, thinking Majestic is going to have to pay it anyway, and helps
the plaintiffs prepare invoices to present to Majestic. Majestic doesn't know anything about the
workmen's hours, rate of pay, or anything else,
so as to Majestic, it is reasonably and honestly
disputed, not only as to amount, but as to the
more fundamental question of liability. Majestic
pays the "invoices" at face value without attempting to differentiate between bounced checks, saw
rental, and wages, in order to get rid of, once and
for all, a troublesome claim, meritorious or not.
Plaintiffs agree to accept the payment as payment
in full from Majestic and to release Majestic from
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all further liability of any kind. Now will someone argue that because Majestic only paid the
amount that Pepper was under a primary duty
(and Majestic perhaps under a contingent secondary liability) to pay anyway that Majestic isn't
released? Especially when the rights were · reserved as against Pepper when the plaintiffs accepted the money from Majestic?
The evidence on the question of what really happened hardly needs further summation. ·Each of the
plaintiffs as well as Humpherys and Pepper all told the
identical story. While they didn't like it, and protested,
they signed written releases anyway and all of them
testified that they intended the documents to constitute
full and complete releases. While the wording and diction used to evidence the plaintiffs' intent to release are
not the best chosen lawyer-words for the purpose· (they
were drafted by a layman), together with the oral testimony of the parties they leave no room for doubt that
that parties intended them to be full and complete releases of any and all claims. The plaintiffs seek to avoid
their effect not on the basis of factual intent, but' rather
on the basis of legal insufficiency of the consideration.
The whole attack on the releases has been launched
along the lines of legal insufficiency of consideration and
not along the lines of factual intent.
Plaintiffs rely entirely on the rule stated in 12 Am
Jur, Page 582, Section 88, which says:
"The performance or promise of performance of
a legal duty imposed by law or arising from the
contract with the other party is insufficient consideration for a promise."
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A reading of the cases cited in the voluminous footnotes to this section readily discloses that in each case
cited, said section is dealing with an agreement to compromise a liquidated and undisputed debt. One needs
only to read the following section 12 Am Jur Contract,
Section 89, page 583, to see that:
"Even in jurisdictions (adhering to the rule) the
courts have frequently criticized the reasonableness or fairness of the rule. Since the rule is not
favored, the decisions indicate in a striking manner the extreme ingenuity of the courts in avoiding its operation."
Of course, section 88 and 89 deal generally with the
problem of consideration in contracts, and do not focus
on the question of consideration in release contracts, a
special kind of contract, and so is full of general statements not helpful to the question at bar. Special treatment to this problem of releases is given in 45 Am Jur
Releases, Section 13, where emphasis is lent to the
proposition that the partial payment of a liquidated and
debt. Conversely, if the debt is unliquidated or disputed,
the opposite rule applies.
The Restatement of Contracts, Volume 1, Section 76
sets forth the correct principle in illustration No. 4:
"A owes B a debt which is unliquidated, or of
which either the existence or amount is honestly
and reasonable disputed. A payment of any
amount by A is sufficient consideration for B's
agreement to accept it in full satisfaction.
This is the co:Qtrolling statement of law on this fourth
and final point, for the following undeniable reasons:
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(1) While Majestic may have had a statutory
secondary and contingent liability to the plaintiffs,
it had no then presently existing and ascertained
duty to them.
(2) Majestic's liability was exceedingly doubtful and the subject of an honest and reasonable
dispute between it and the plaintiffs.
(3') There was no then presently existing legal
duty established by the Pepper-Majestic contract
and there was no contractual relationship between
Majestic and the plaintiffs and

( 4) The fact that the statute requires the
owner to pay unpaid wages on construction jobs
if the contractor does not pay them in the event no
bond is furnished as required, creates only a contingent and not a presently existing duty. It
would require a law suit and a judgment to liquidate the claim against the contingent co-obligor,
Majestic.
The requirements of a valid accord and satisfaction
are set forth in 1 Am Jur Accord and Satisfaction, Page
217, Sec. 4.
"The Discharge of claims by way of accord and
satisfaction is depende,nt upon an (accord and
satisfaction) contract, express or implied, and it
follows that the essentials necessary to valid c.ontracts generally must be present in a contract of
accord and satisfaction. Therefore, the following
elements are essential: (1) a proper subject matter (2) competent parties (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties and ( 4) a consideration."
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For a more thorough treatment of the subject and
for authority to the effect that an accord and satisfaction
need not be in writing (although it is in writing in the
instant case) see 75 ALR 905, Section 3. At Page 916
we read:
"Generally where the amount is unliquidated or
disputed, and a remittance of an amount less than
that claimed is sent to the creditor, together with
a statement that it is full satisfaction of the claim,
and the tender is accompanied by such acts or
declarations as amount to a condition that, if the
remittance is accepted, it is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed claim, and the creditor
is aware of such conditions, the acceptance of such
remittance constitutes an accord and satisfaction,
although the creditor protests at the time that the
amount tendered is not accepted in full satisfaction.''
In this connection, it should be borne in mind that
not only were written releases signed and delivered, the
settlement checks of Majestic to the workmen contain
within their four corners similar language pertaining to
release, were issued only after extended disputes and
contentions as to amount and liability on the part of
Majestic, and were accompanied by statements on both
sides that this was a complete and final release and that
unless the plaintiffs agreed to release Majestic com.pletely, they wouldn't get their checks. The plaintiffs
did sign, they did release, and they did get their money.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that upon finding estoppel, the balance of the questions raised by this brief are moot, like-
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wise upon finding no prima-facia case, the remaining two
questions are unnecessary to treat, and upon finding a
release of one of two obligors that the last question is
academic, and there failing, a finding of a valid release
is a bar to any recovery by the plaintiffs, but that a
finding on any one of the four issues is grounds to reverse
the judgment of the trial court and that the evidence and
the law allows for no conclusions other than a finding on
each of the four points in favor of the defendant Majestic
and against the plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT

Attorney for the DefendantAppellant, Majestic
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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